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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Alabama has never hidden its contempt for arbitration or its disapproval
of the broad reach of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).' Even after
numerous failed attempts to constrain the application of the FAA, the
Alabama Supreme Court yet again jumped at an opportunity-provided by
the United States Supreme Court's language in United States v. Lopez2-to
do just that. Reading and applying that language in a way that narrowed the
reach of the FAA, the Alabama Supreme Court decided Alafabco, Inc. v.
Citizens Bank,3 holding that an economic transaction between two Alabama
residents was beyond the reach of the Act.4
Granting certiorari and reversing the Alabama Supreme Court's decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court's per curium opinion took steps to clarify the reach
of the FAA. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the impact of
Lopez on the Act, sending a strong message to all who might contemplate an
interpretation similar to that of the Alabama Supreme Court in an attempt to
subvert the FAA's full scope. 5
To fully understand the impact of the Alafabco decision, one must
consider it within the context of the history and development of the FAA,
which includes periods during which many states (especially Alabama) and
their courts refused to accept the U.S. Supreme Court's expansive reading of
the Act's scope. Congress passed the FAA6 in 1925 in an effort to "legitimize
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism and to compel parties who
[had] entered into an arbitration agreement, but who [attempted] to sue, to
resolve their disputes through arbitration." 7 Throughout the history of the
* Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003).
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
2 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3 Alafabco, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 872 So. 2d 798 (Ala. 2002).
4 Id. at 805.
5 See Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 58.
6 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
7 Charity Robl, Recent Development, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 17 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 219, 219 (citing Holland & Hart, High Court Holds Worker to
Signed Agreement, 6 WYO. EMP. LAW LETTER, June 2001, at 7).
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FAA, some states have waged a war of sorts against its enforcement. 8 A
number of state legislatures passed laws that invalidated arbitration clauses
and agreements, and some state courts attempted to find ways to enforce
those anti-arbitration statutes in conflict with U.S. Supreme Court decisions
regarding such activities. 9 It is within this context that the U.S. Supreme
Court decided a line of cases attempting to define the breadth, scope, and
power of the FAA. Central to the issue is § 2 of the FAA 10 which has been
examined in cases such as Southland Corp. v. Keating" and Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.12 Southland established the preemptive nature of
§ 2,13 and Allied-Bruce defined its scope broadly to reach as far as Congress'
Commerce Clause power. 14 It was at this point in the development of FAA
§ 2 jurisprudence that the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lopez and brought
confusion to the world of FAA preemption/expansion. It was forced to
decide Alafabco in order to reestablish (reasonable) clarity with regards to
the issues of FAA applicability, scope, and preemption by directly addressing
these Lopez questions.
8 See Kirsten Brown, Comment, State Court Attempts to Limit Applicability of the
Federal Arbitration Act in a Post-Lopez World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051, 1051, 1064-
65 (2002); Bryan L. Quick, Note, Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corporation: Is the
Montana Supreme Court Undermining the Federal Arbitration Act?, 63 MONT. L. REv.
445, 445-47 (2002); Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth
Circuit, 35 TEX. TECH L. REv. 497, 500 (2004).
9 See Edmond Seferi, Note and Comment, FAA and Arbitration Clauses-How Far
Can it Reach? The Effect of Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson, 19 CAMPBELL L.
REv. 607, 613 (1997).
10 Section 2 of the FAA provides that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
11 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
12 Allied-Bruce Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
13 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
14 Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 270.
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II. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A quasi-contractual15 relationship existed between Citizens Bank (an
Alabama lending institution) and Alafabco, Inc. (an Alabama fabrication and
construction company) that eventually resulted in a dispute related to the
Bank's refusal to provide Alafabco with capital for construction projects on
which it allegedly encouraged the company to bid. 16 Alafabco used money
previously allocated 17 for repayment of prior debts owed to the Bank to fund
these construction contracts. 18 This eventually led to Alafabco's default on
the debt and an agreement between the two parties for debt restructuring that
took the form of "renewal notes," which included an arbitration agreement. 19
Eventually, Alafabco filed a petition for bankruptcy protection. 20 The parties
negotiated a deal whereby Alafabco agreed to dismiss its bankruptcy petition,
entering into a second set of "renewal notes" complete with an arbitration
agreement that was "functionally identical" to the first.21 Soon after
executing this agreement, Alafabco filed suit in Alabama state court,
prompting Citizens Bank to move to compel arbitration. 22 The court granted
the Bank's motion and ordered the parties to participate in arbitration per
their agreement. 23 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama, over Justice
See's dissent,24 reversed the lower court. 25 The court based its decision upon
15 As alleged by Alafabco, it and Citizens Bank had an "understanding" whereby the
Bank would agree to provide the company with all the required capital in order to
complete the building projects. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 53 (2003)
("[T]he bank agreed to provide operating capital necessary for Alafabco to secure and
complete construction contracts."). The original complaint contained allegations
regarding this "implied agreement." See Alafabco, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 872 So. 2d 798,
799 (Ala. 2002).
16 Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 53.
17 See id. ("Alafabco completed the Courtland project with funds that would
otherwise have been dedicated to repaying existing obligations to the bank. Alafabco in
turn became delinquent in repaying those existing obligations.").
18 Id.
19 Id. at 53-54.
20 Id. at 54.
21 Id.
2 2 Id. at 53.
23 Id.
24 Justice See dissented, explaining that, from his view, the court had erred in its
formulation of the Sisters test that involved a reading of the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Lopez. Id. at 55. Justice See rejected the stringent test-which required
"that 'a particular contract, in order to be enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act,
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the application of a test it previously announced in Sisters of the Visitation v.
Cochran Plaster Co.26 Simply stated, the test was "whether [the debt-
restructuring] transactions by themselves, had a 'substantial effect on
interstate commerce."' 27 The court held that an insufficient nexus 
with
interstate commerce existed for the FAA to apply because there was 
no
evidence that: (1) the restructured debt was attributable in any way to
interstate commerce; (2) the debt originated out-of-state; or (3) the debt was
inseparable from out-of-state projects. 28  Since the debt-restructuring
agreements did not, in the eyes of the Alabama Supreme Court, have 
enough
of an effect on interstate commerce to invoke FAA, the Alabama 
anti-
arbitration statute was not preempted, and thus, the arbitration agreement
between Citizens Bank and Alafabco was invalid.
29
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately rejected the majority decision of the
Supreme Court of Alabama, reversed the decision, and remanded the case 
for
further proceedings. 30 To reach this conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court
began by revisiting its holding in Allied-Bruce.
31 It reemphasized its earlier
must, by itself, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,' 
-- in favor of "a more
generous view" of the necessary effect on interstate commerce. Id. (quoting Alafabco,
Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 872 So. 2d 798, 808 (Ala. 2002)). Thus, Justice See would 
have
found that the debt restructuring met the FAA's "involving commerce" 
iequirement. Id.
25 Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 55.
26 Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plaster Co., 775 So. 2d 759 (Ala. 2000)
(interpreting the United States Supreme Court decision in Lopez). For 
further discussion
of Lopez, see infra Part IV.
27 Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 55 (quoting Alafabco, 872 So. 2d at 803).
28 See id. (citing Alafabco, 872 So. 2d at 805).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 58.
31 Allied-Bruce Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 265 (1995). In Allied-Bruce, the
Court addressed (among other matters) the scope of the FAA. After first rejecting 
a
request to overrule its Southland decision, the court examined the appropriate 
reach of the
Act. As Justice Breyer's opinion explains the issue:
[Allied-Bruce concerned] the reach of § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. That
section makes enforceable a written arbitration provision in "a contract 
evidencing a
transaction involving commerce." Should we read this phrase broadly, extending 
the
Act's reach to the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power? Or, do 
the two
italicized words---"involving" and "evidencing'-significantly restrict 
the Act's
application?
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interpretation of the FAA § 2 term "involving commerce" as "the functional
equivalent of the more familiar term 'affecting commerce'-words of art that
ordinarily signal the broadest permissible exercise of Congress' Commerce
Clause power." 32 Thus, "it [was] perfectly clear [to the U.S. Supreme Court]
that the FAA encompasse[d] a wider range of transactions than those actually
'in commerce'-that is, 'within the flow of interstate commerce."' 3
3
Applying this broad reading of the FAA's scope from Allied-Bruce, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that the Supreme Court of Alabama was
"misguided in its search for evidence that a 'portion of the restructured debt
was actually attributable to interstate transactions' or that the loans
'originated out-of-state' or that 'the restructured debt was inseparable from
any out-of-state projects.' 34
It also denounced the Supreme Court of Alabama's reasoning that FAA
application was defeated "because the individual debt-restructuring, taken
alone, did not have a 'substantial effect on interstate commerce."' 35 As it
stated in Mandeville,36 the "Commerce Clause power 'may be exercised in
individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate
commerce' if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would
represent 'a general practice ... subject to federal control.' 37 So long as the
general practice "bear[s] on interstate commerce in a substantial way," it is
within the reach of Congress' Commerce Clause power, and thus the FAA.38
The U.S. Supreme Court found the Alafabco case to be "well within [its]
previous pronouncements on the extent of Congress' Commerce Clause
Id. at 268 (internal citations omitted). The Court concluded "that the broader reading of
the Act is the correct one." Id. The Court reasoned that "the basic purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act is to overcome courts' refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate." Id. at
270. Additionally, the FAA represents an exercise of Congress' "'control over interstate
commerce....' Id. at 271 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388
U.S. 395, 405 (1967).
32 Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56 (quoting Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-74)."
33 Id. (quoting Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273).
34Id. at 56 (quoting Alafabco, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 872 So. 2d 798, 805 (Ala.
2002)). As the Court noted, "[s]uch evidence might be required if the FAA were
restricted to transactions actually 'in commerce ....' Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1974)). However, the Court has not so
restricted the FAA's reach. See id.
35 Id. (citing Alafabco, 872 So. 2d at 808).
36 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948).
37 Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56-57 (quoting Mandeville, 334 U.S. at 236).
38 Id. at 57 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 n.27 (1968)).
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power". for three reasons (despite the fact that it involved agreements
executed by Alabama residents in Alabama).39 First, Alafabco conducted
business in other states using loans from the Bank that were the subject of the
debt-restructuring agreements. 40 The second reason centered around the use
of all of Alafabco's business assets--"including its inventory of goods
assembled from out-of-state parts and raw materials" 41-to secure the
restructured debt.42 Finally, to answer concerns regarding "any residual
doubt about the magnitude of the impact on interstate commerce caused by
the particular economic transactions in which the parties were engaged," it
considered the "general practice" of those transactions. 43 The U.S. Supreme
Court stated that, "[n]o elaborate explanation [was] needed to make evident
the broad impact of commercial lending on the national economy or
Congress' power to regulate that activity pursuant to the Commerce
Clause."44
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Alabama's
decision in Sisters45 "adhere[d] to an improperly cramped view of Congress'
Commerce Clause power" derived from a misreading of Lopez.46 It explicitly
stated that "Lopez did not restrict the reach of the FAA or implicitly overrule
Allied-Bruce. 47 "Nor did Lopez purport to announce a new rule governing
Congress' Commerce Clause power over concededly economic activity such
as the debt-restructuring agreements .... 48 Having so found, it granted
Citizens Banks petition for writ of certiorari, reversed the Supreme Court of
Alabama, and remanded the case.49
IV. THE BROADER EFFECT OF ALAFABCO
The Alafabco decision directly answers questions raised by, and fills
gaps caused by, the U.S. Supreme Court's seemingly bipolar decisions in
3 9 Id.
40 Id. (stating that the "loans to Alafabco had been used in part to finance large
construction projects in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama").
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 57-58 (quoting Mandeville, 334 U.S. at 236).
44 Id. at 58 (citing Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38-39 (1980)).
45 Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plaster Co., 775 So. 2d 759, 759 (Ala. 2000).
46 Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 58.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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Allied-Bruce and Lopez. Alafabco also reestablishes the preemptive power of
the FAA--often challenged by Alabama and its courts-such that those in
favor of arbitration now have a case to take to the lower-level courts that,
until recently, might have been confused as to the interplay between the FAA
and state anti-arbitration laws.50
A. A History of Preemption
It is often said that "a page of History is worth a volume of logic." 51
Such is the case with § 2 of the FAA. The rise of FAA § 2 expansion began
in 1983 with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Southland, which
involved a suit by a class of franchisees against a franchisor of 7-Eleven
stores under claims of, among other things, violating disclosure requirements
of California's Franchise Investment Law (FIL).52 On appeal of the
California Supreme Court's decision that the FAA did not preempt California
law, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, and held that the Act applied to state
courts and did in fact preempt the California law as it applied to arbitration
agreements.53 Thus, "[s]ince the United States Supreme Court's decision in
[Southland], the Federal Arbitration Act has been read as embodying a
'national policy favoring arbitration. '54
Following the policy set forth in Southland, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Allied-Bruce to define the scope of the Act. Allied-Bruce involved a
suit by an Alabama homeowner against an exterminating company pertaining
to a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan."'55 The contract happened to contain
an arbitration agreement that Allied-Bruce, in conjunction with a request for
a stay, attempted to enforce once the homeowners initiated a lawsuit. 56 The
trial court denied Allied-Bruce's request for stay and refused to submit the
matter to arbitration. 57 The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower
50 Donald Lee Rome, High Court Reverses Alabama Court's "Cramped Reading"
of Interstate Commerce, 58 DIsP. RESOL. J. 4, 5 (Aug.-Oct. 2003).
51 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
52 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1984).
53 Id. at 16; see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption,
79 IND. L.J. 393, 397 (2004).
54 Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BuFF. L. REv. 185, 185 (2004) (citing Southland, 465 U.S. at 10
(O'Connor & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting)).
55 Allied-Bruce Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995).
56 Id. at 269.
57 Id.
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court's decision and held that, in this situation, the FAA did not preempt the
Alabama law that invalidated arbitration agreements because the contract at
issue had too slight of a connection with interstate commerce. 58 On appeal,
and prior to reaching the main issue of the scope of the FAA, the U.S.
Supreme Court laid out three guiding points. "First, the basic purpose of the
Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome the courts' refusal to enforce
agreements to arbitrate." 59 Second, in enacting the FAA, Congress relied in
some part on its power to control interstate commerce. 60 "Third, the Court
had held in Southland that the FAA applies in state courts, and, thus, 'state
courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements. ' 61
Having laid out these points, it declined to overrule Southland,62 and instead
moved on to examine the scope of the FAA.63 In doing so, it construed the
"involving commerce" language of FAA § 2 as the "functional equivalent" of
the Commerce Clause's "affecting commerce" language.64 The U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately determined that the scope of the FAA extended to
the full reach of Congress' Commerce Clause power.65 Thus, if a transaction
58 1d.
59 Id. at 270.
60 Id. at 271.
6 1 Id. at 272.
62 The Court in Allied-Bruce reasoned that the Southland Court had already
considered the basic arguments raised by the respondents and amici. Id. The Court stated
that nothing had significantly changed over the ten years since Southland was decided
and no later cases had eroded its authority. Id. Additionally, the Court had not seen
evidence of unforeseen practical problems arising as a result of the Southland doctrine.
Id. Rather, the Court noted that it was likely that a number of private parties had relied on
Southland when writing contracts. Id. Finally, the Court justified its refusal to overrule
Southland by acknowledging that both before and after the decision, Congress has only
taken action to expand the scope of arbitration, never retract it. Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 273-74. To reach this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the words
"involving commerce" were "broader than the often-found words of art "in commerce."
Id. at 273. The Court examined the FAA's statutory language and determined that "the
word 'involving' is broad and is indeed the functional equivalent of 'affecting."' Id. at
273-74. The Court explained that such a reading was consistent with its earlier decisions
in which it "described the Act's reach expansively as coinciding with that of the
Commerce Clause." Id. at 274 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1989) and
Southland, 465 U.S. at 14-15). To conclude this portion of its analysis, the Court stated
that "a broad interpretation of ["involving commerce"] is consistent with the Act's basic
purpose, to put arbitration provisions on 'the same footing' as a contract's other terms."
Id. at 275 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
65 Id. at 275.
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fell within the scope of the Commerce Clause, it fell within the reach of the
FAA, which then preempted state laws precluding arbitration.66
Not long after Allied-Bruce seemed to set the standard by which one
could measure the reach of the FAA, the U.S. Supreme Court began a new
saga in the preemption battle with its decision in Lopez. The Lopez case
involved a challenge to Congress' Gun-Free School Zone Act.67 A high
school student, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., carried a concealed handgun into his
school and was subsequently charged and convicted of violating the Act.68
Prior to his conviction, Lopez sought to have the charges dropped because
the Act, as he argued, was "beyond the power of Congress to legislate control
over.., public schools," and was thus unconstitutional. 69 The district court's
denial of Lopez's motion led to his conviction. 70 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned the conviction and stated that the Act was beyond
Congress' Commerce Clause power.71 Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted the petition for writ of certiorari and held that Congress had, in fact,
overstepped its Commerce Clause power with the Act.72
Following a detailed analysis of the history of the Commerce Clause
power, it stated three jurisprudential points pertaining to the Clause. 73 The
first was that Congress has the power to regulate the use of interstate
commerce channels.74 Second, Congress has the power to regulate activities
in order to protect "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce." 75 Third, Congress has the power to regulate
activities that have "a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 76 As to
the third point, the test is whether the activity "substantially affects"
66 Id.; see also Lea Richmond IV, Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering
Co.: Earnest Federalism or Reconstructive Defiance to the Federal Arbitration Act, 25
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 633, 637 (2002) ("Allied-Bruce signaled the United States Supreme
Court's desire to increase the FAA's scope over individual contracts that affected
interstate commerce.").
67 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
(1990)).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 552.
71 Id.
72 See generally id.
73 Id. at 558.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 1d. at 558-59 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937)).
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interstate commerce. 77 The U.S. Supreme Court, in applying this test to
Lopez's situation, ultimately held that regulation of guns in school zones is in
no sense an economic activity that might substantially affect interstate
commerce.78 Its decision in Lopez raised a number of questions and left other
courts free to interpret its meaning and effect as they pleased.
B. Questions Abound After Allied-Bruce and Lopez
Having just extended the reach of the FAA to the comers of Congress'
Commerce Clause power, the U.S. Supreme Court turned around and
arguably retracted the scope of that power. This decision left many
wondering about the impact of either case on the FAA, and it opened the
door for some courts to again attempt to circumvent FAA preemption.
Following Lopez, courts were left with a choice as to how they could
interpret the scope of the FAA. A number of post-Lopez decisions fall into
one of three categories. 79 The first category consists of cases in which courts
applied an "Affects Approach," simply ignoring the Lopez decision as
irrelevant in the context of the FAA's scope. 80 The second category consists
of cases in which courts took a "Substantially Affects
Approach... incorporat[ing] Lopez's requirement that any law passed by
Congress under its commerce powers must regulate an activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce." 81 Finally, some courts applied the
"Three Categories of Commerce Approach" which "encompasses the
'Substantially Affects Approach' and recognizes it as one of three areas in
which Congress may legislate under its commerce power." 82
77 Id. at 559.
78 Id. at 567.
79 See Brown, supra note 8, at 1057-58.
80 Id. at 1058-59 & nn.58-63 (citing and discussing Grohn v. Sisters of Charity
Health Servs., 960 P.2d 722 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); Alford v. Johnson Rice & Co., 773
So. 2d 255, 258 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/15/00); Saga Communications of New England, Inc.
v. Voornas, 756 A.2d 954 (Me. 2000); Duggan v. Zip Mail Servs., Inc., 920 S.W.2d 200
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Towe, Hester & Erwin v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947
P.2d 594, 596 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997); Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assoc., 553 S.E.2d 110
(S.C. 2001)).
81 Id. at 1057, 1060-61 & nn.74 & 76-77 (citing and discussing Rogers Found.
Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So. 2d 869 (Ala. 1989); Ikon Office Solutions v. Eifert, 2
S.W.3d 688, 691 (Tex. App. 1999); Russ Berrie & Co. Inc. v. Michael Gantt, 998 S.W.2d
713 (Tex. App. 1999)).
82 Id. at 1057, 1063-64 & nn.89 & 90 (citing and discussing Robert Frank McAlpine
Architecture, Inc. v. Heilpern, 712 So. 2d 738 (Ala. 1998); City of Cut Bank v. Tom
Patrick Constr., 963 P.2d 1283 (Mont. 1998)).
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It is in this third category of opinions that the generally anti-FAA
Alabama Supreme Court83 decided Sisters.84 While making its decision, the
court examined five characteristics of the transaction to see whether it
"substantially affect[ed]" interstate commerce. 85 The Alabama Supreme
Court used a narrow interpretation of Lopez to counter the U.S. Supreme
Court's efforts to broaden the scope of the FAA through Allied-Bruce.86
Armed with its reading of Lopez as a limitation on the FAA's scope, the
Supreme Court of Alabama decided Alafabco.
C. Alafabco-Alabama Take Heed
Frustrated by the state courts' abusive misreadings of Lopez, the U.S.
Supreme Court clarified its decision and quashed a number of potential
interpretations. 87 Three years after leaving the scope of the FAA in limbo, it
took the opportunity presented by Alafabco to definitively and clearly lay out
its stance on the FAA, to address its decisions in Allied-Bruce and Lopez, and
83 See generally Richmond, supra note 66.
84 See Brown, supra note 8, at 1057-67.
85 Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plaster Co., 775 So. 2d 759, 765 (Ala. 2000).
The five components considered by the court were:
(1) a contract solely between two local parties, both of them engaging in
activities that do not involve any person or entity in another State; (2) tools and
equipment, which, although they moved in interstate commerce, were not purchased
or leased solely for the farmer to perform the particular contract at issue; (3)
substantially more than half of the amount paid to the farmer by the other landowner
is allocable to the cost of the services rendered by the farmer, who renders those
services without using persons or entities from another State, while substantially less
than half of the amount paid is allocable to the cost of materials specially purchased
for use or consumption in the farmer's performance of the contract; (4) the object of
the services is incapable of subsequent movement across State lines or otherwise
having a subsequent substantial effect on interstate commerce; (5) such a degree of
separability from any contracts that are subject to the FAA that allowing this
contract to remain outside the scope of the Act would not substantially disrupt
activities that Congress intended to be subject to the Act.
Id.
86 "The United States Supreme Court's rhetoric in Allied-Bruce symbolized the
Court's intention to strengthen the FAA and quash anti-arbitration state law." Richmond,
supra note 66, at 642 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
Alabama's reconciliation of Allied-Bruce and Lopez was to state that "for a particular
contract to invoke the FAA, the contract must, in fact, substantially affect interstate
commerce." Id. at 644 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1989)).
87 See id. at 633.
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to scold those courts that attempted to take advantage of the temporary lapse
in clarity regarding the FAA by construing its scope narrowly.
This has no greater implications in any state than it does in Alabama-a
state in which arbitration is an important and charged issue. 88 Combine the
importance of arbitration with the fact that Alabama is historically an anti-
arbitration state, 89 and it is no wonder the state judiciary jumped at the
opportunity to limit the scope of FAA application.90 The question remains
whether-without the ability to narrowly construe the Act's scope through
Lopez-Alabama will fall in line with the national sentiment favoring
arbitration. More broadly, will other states opposed to arbitration finally
accept the U.S. Supreme Court's message or will they continue to devise
creative schemes to avoid the FAA and give effect to state anti-arbitration
laws? One thing is for certain: Any court that wants to try to use Lopez to
justify a narrow reading of the FAA's scope in an economic transaction
setting had better be ready for a chiding 91 by the U.S. Supreme Court. One
need only look to its treatment of the Alabama Supreme Court's Alafabco
decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's Alafabco ruling settled the dispute over the
effect of Lopez on both the FAA and Allied-Bruce's definition of its scope.
Furthermore, Alafabco sent a message to Alabama that arbitration and the
FAA are here to stay. While Lopez left room for courts to narrow the reach of
the FAA through a restrictive reading of that decision, Alafabco set the
record straight. It did not intend for Lopez to narrow the scope of the FAA,
and it certainly did not intend to open the door for courts to ignore the FAA's
preemptive power. Alafabco states this plainly and clearly, leaving little
room (unlike Lopez) for misguided interpretations by the Alabama Supreme
Court, or any other court for that matter.
James A. Cannatti, I1
88 Id. ("Perhaps no other state makes arbitration a political issue more than
Alabama.").
89 See Brown, supra note 8, at 1061; see also Huber, supra note 8, at 501 (calling
the Supreme Court of Alabama "the most antiarbitration court in the nation").
90 See Brown, supra note 8, at 1061 (discussing how Alabama's state courts "often
use the Lopez decision as a technique to circumvent the national policy of enforcing
arbitration agreements").
91 See Huber, supra note 8, at 500 ("In Alafabco, the Court chastised the Alabama
Supreme Court for its continuing hostility to arbitration .... ).
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